Mossadegh Digulingkan di Iran - Sejarah

Mossadegh Digulingkan di Iran - Sejarah

Pada tahun 1951, di bawah arahan Perdana Menteri Iran Mohammed Mossadegh, pemerintah Iran menasionalisasi industri minyak Iran (sebelumnya dimiliki oleh Perusahaan Minyak Anglo-Iran). Inggris mengajukan banding ke Mahkamah Internasional, yang memutuskan mendukung Inggris. Sepanjang tahun 1952, perselisihan antara Inggris dan Iran berkecamuk. Pada tahun 1953, Mossadegh mulai menargetkan orang kaya Iran karena tidak membayar pajak. Mossadegh juga menargetkan Keluarga Kerajaan. Pada 16 Agustus, setelah mencoba menggulingkan Mossadegh, Shah terpaksa melarikan diri. Dia kembali berkuasa enam hari kemudian, setelah tentara bangkit melawan Mossadegh, dengan bantuan dinas intelijen AS dan Inggris.

Kilas Balik: Di Dalam Sejarah Rumit Antara AS dan Iran

Ketegangan antara AS dan Iran meningkat minggu ini ketika Korps Pengawal Revolusi Iran (IRGC) menembak jatuh sebuah pesawat tak berawak AS, hampir memicu serangan udara balasan. Iran mengatakan bahwa pesawat itu telah memasuki wilayah udara negara itu. AS mengklaim bahwa pesawat tak berawak yang jatuh itu terbang di atas perairan internasional, mencirikan insiden itu sebagai 'serangan tak beralasan.'

Ini hanya babak terbaru dalam sejarah kompleks antara Iran dan AS, yang dieksplorasi FRONTLINE sebagai bagian dari film dokumenter 2018 Saingan Pahit: Iran dan Arab Saudi.

Seperti yang ditunjukkan dalam bab pembuka film dua bagian, setidaknya beberapa ketegangan antara Amerika dan Iran dapat ditelusuri kembali ke tahun 1953, ketika kudeta yang direkayasa oleh CIA dan mata-mata Inggris menggulingkan Mohammed Mossadegh, pria parlemen Iran. dipilih untuk memimpin pemerintahan pertama yang dipilih secara demokratis.

Mossadegh, yang menasionalisasi industri minyak Iran yang dikelola Inggris dan mengusir shah yang didukung Barat dari Teheran, ditangkap dan hidup di penangkaran sampai kematiannya 14 tahun kemudian.

Seperti yang diceritakan film tersebut, setelah penggulingan Mossadegh, AS memainkan peran kunci dalam mendukung aturan represif Shah yang diinstal ulang. Itu datang melalui kata-kata dan kekuatan militer: Presiden Jimmy Carter memuji “kepemimpinan hebat” Syah, AS menjual senjata kepadanya dan CIA melatih polisi rahasianya, yang secara brutal menekan oposisi. Ketidakpuasan rakyat Iran terhadap Syah, dan apa yang mereka lihat sebagai eksploitasi Barat selama beberapa dekade, akan berujung pada revolusi 1979 dan kebangkitan Ayatollah Khomeini.

“Ada antusiasme dan dukungan yang sangat besar karena garis awal Khomeini tidak sektarian, melawan Sunni dan semacamnya, itu anti-Amerika,” Ahmed Rashid, penulis buku Turun ke Kekacauan, kepada FRONTLINE dalam film tersebut.


Sejarah BP British Petroleum dan Perannya dalam Kudeta Iran 1953

BP dituduh menghancurkan satwa liar dan garis pantai Amerika, tetapi jika Anda melihat kembali ke sejarah, Anda menemukan bahwa BP melakukan sesuatu yang lebih buruk ke Amerika.

Mereka memberi dunia Ayatollah Khomeini.

Tentu saja ada banyak faktor yang menyebabkan terjadinya revolusi Iran, tetapi pada tahun 1951 Perusahaan Minyak Anglo-Iran – yang kemudian menjadi BP – dan pemilik utamanya pemerintah Inggris, bersekongkol untuk menghancurkan demokrasi dan memasang rezim -dikendalikan di Iran. Kemarahan yang dihasilkan dan represi yang mengikutinya adalah salah satu penyebab utama revolusi Iran pada tahun 1978/79 – yang di antaranya adalah rezim Islam Ayatollah Khomeini.

Dan terlebih lagi, BP dan pemerintah Inggris begitu arogan dan kikuk dalam menangani krisis sehingga mereka harus membujuk Amerika untuk membantu mereka. Mereka melakukan ini dengan berpura-pura ada ancaman komunis terhadap Iran. Pemerintah Amerika, yang dipimpin oleh Presiden Eisenhower, percaya mereka dan CIA diperintahkan untuk merekayasa kudeta yang menyingkirkan perdana menteri Iran Mohamed Mossadegh.

Dan kemarahan yang dihasilkan dari kudeta di antara orang-orang Iran menjadi sangat dalam. Ini adalah akar mengapa Amerika sekarang dikenal sebagai “Setan Besar” di Iran, dan mengapa kedutaan Amerika pada tahun 1979 dibenci sebagai “sarang mata-mata” oleh kaum revolusioner.

Sejarah perusahaan yang sekarang kita sebut BP selama seratus tahun terakhir benar-benar menelusuri busur kapitalisme transnasional global. Perusahaan ini dimulai sebagai semacam operasi liar di Iran pada dekade pertama abad kedua puluh. Itu sangat kewirausahaan dan pengambilan risiko, dan mereka memiliki sekelompok ahli geologi yang berkeliaran di padang rumput dan gurun yang sangat terlarang ini, dan akhirnya mereka menemukan apa yang merupakan penemuan terbesar hingga saat itu dalam sejarah industri minyak. Merekalah yang menemukan bahwa Iran sedang duduk di atas lautan minyak. Dan kemudian mereka memutuskan untuk mengambilnya. Di bawah kesepakatan korup yang mereka buat dengan beberapa perwakilan dari monarki Iran lama yang menurun, semuanya telah dilunasi oleh perusahaan, konsesi ini, yang kemudian dikenal sebagai Perusahaan Minyak Anglo-Persia, menjamin dirinya sendiri, atau menang. hak untuk memiliki, semua minyak Iran. Jadi, tak seorang pun di Iran memiliki hak untuk mengebor minyak atau mengekstrak minyak atau menjual minyak.

Kemudian, segera setelah penemuan itu dilakukan, pemerintah Inggris memutuskan untuk membeli perusahaan tersebut. Jadi DPR mengesahkan undang-undang dan membeli 51 persen dari perusahaan itu. Dan selama tahun 1920-an dan 1930-an dan 1940-an, seluruh standar hidup yang dinikmati orang-orang di Inggris didukung oleh minyak dari Iran. Semua truk dan jip di Inggris dijalankan dengan minyak Iran. Pabrik-pabrik di seluruh Inggris didanai oleh minyak dari Iran. Royal Navy, yang memproyeksikan kekuatan Inggris di seluruh dunia, dijalankan 100 persen dengan minyak dari Iran. Sehingga menjadi landasan fundamental kehidupan Inggris.

Dan kemudian, setelah Perang Dunia II, ketika angin nasionalisme dan anti-kolonialisme bertiup ke seluruh negara berkembang, orang-orang Iran mengembangkan ide ini: kita harus mengambil kembali minyak kita. Dan itulah yang umum — jenis semangat nasional yang membawa Mohammad Mosaddegh berkuasa, yang merupakan tokoh paling menonjol dalam periode demokrasi Iran selama akhir 40-an dan awal 50-an. Adalah keinginan Mosaddegh, yang didukung oleh suara bulat dari parlemen Iran yang dipilih secara demokratis, untuk menasionalisasi apa yang saat itu adalah Perusahaan Minyak Anglo-Iran. Mereka melakukan nasionalisasi.

Inggris dan mitra mereka di Amerika Serikat dengan keras menentang ini. Dan ketika mereka tidak dapat mencegah hal itu terjadi, mereka mengorganisir penggulingan Mosaddegh pada tahun 1953. Jadi penggulingan itu tidak hanya menghasilkan akhir dari pemerintahan Mosaddegh, tetapi juga akhir dari demokrasi di Iran, dan yang memicu semua konsekuensi berikut ini. . Shah memerintah selama dua puluh lima tahun dengan meningkatnya represi. Kekuasaannya menghasilkan ledakan akhir 70-an yang menghasilkan rezim Islam. Jadi, untuk melindungi kepentingan perusahaan minyak yang sekarang kita kenal sebagai BP, CIA dan Dinas Rahasia Inggris bergabung bersama untuk menggulingkan pemerintahan demokratis di Iran dan menghasilkan semua konsekuensi yang telah kita lihat di Iran selama setengah tahun terakhir- abad.

AMY GOODMAN: Dan itu melibatkan kedua saudara Dulles — orang sering terbang ke Bandara Dulles — John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, dan juga cucu Teddy Roosevelt.

STEPHEN KINZER: Ya, sejarah agak mengedipkan mata pada kita dari episode itu. Ini adalah keanehan yang cukup menarik bahwa Theodore Roosevelt, yang pada dasarnya membawa Amerika Serikat ke era perubahan rezim sekitar awal abad kedua puluh, akhirnya memiliki seorang cucu yang memulai era intervensi modern. Ingatlah bahwa Iran adalah negara pertama di mana CIA masuk untuk menggulingkan pemerintah. Ketika Teddy Roosevelt menggulingkan pemerintah, tidak ada CIA. Jadi masing-masing dari mereka membuka bab dalam sejarah intervensionisme Amerika.

AMY GOODMAN: Dan mengapa — sebelum kita melangkah maju sekarang, mengapa AS melakukan intervensi atas nama perusahaan Inggris, yang kemudian menjadi British Petroleum, atau BP?

STEPHEN KINZER: Ada beberapa alasan untuk itu. Sebagian dari itu ada hubungannya dengan keinginan untuk solidaritas transatlantik. Tapi saya benar-benar berpikir ada dua alasan utama. Salah satunya adalah bahwa Amerika meyakinkan diri mereka sendiri bahwa mereka harus memerangi komunisme di suatu tempat di dunia. Itulah gagasan yang membuat Dulles dan Eisenhower berkuasa pada tahun 1953, bahwa mereka tidak akan lagi berpegang pada strategi penahanan komunisme, tetapi mereka akan melakukan strategi kemunduran yang baru. Tetapi begitu mereka berkuasa, mereka berpikir, “Bagaimana kita akan menggulingkan komunisme? Kita tidak bisa menyerang Uni Soviet. Kami tidak akan mengebom China.”

Dan di sinilah bagian lainnya masuk. Inggris sangat ingin menggulingkan Mosaddegh untuk mendapatkan kembali perusahaan minyak mereka. Tetapi ketika mereka mempresentasikan rencana itu kepada Dulles dan Eisenhower, agen yang mereka kirim ke Washington, yang kemudian menulis memoarnya, melakukan sesuatu yang sangat cerdik. Dia memutuskan itu tidak akan berhasil jika saya memberi tahu orang Amerika, “Tolong gulingkan Mosaddegh agar perusahaan minyak kita bisa kembali.” Amerika tidak akan menanggapi itu. Mereka tidak akan cukup peduli. Mereka akan takut dengan preseden pemerintah mengambil alih sebuah perusahaan yang menghasilkan sumber daya di negara miskin. Itu adalah preseden buruk bagi John Foster Dulles dan orang Amerika, seperti halnya bagi Inggris. Tetapi apa yang benar-benar dikhawatirkan Amerika pada saat ini di awal tahun 50-an adalah komunisme, jadi mari kita beri tahu mereka bahwa Mosaddegh memimpin Iran menuju komunisme. Sekarang, Mosaddegh adalah seorang bangsawan tua yang membenci semua ide sosialis dan Marxis, tapi itu hanya detail. Ia mampu digambarkan sebagai orang yang cukup lemah sehingga di kemudian hari kejatuhannya dapat menghasilkan upaya komunis untuk mengambil alih di Iran.

Jadi kombinasi keinginan untuk memastikan bahwa contoh tidak diberikan di dunia bahwa pemerintah nasionalis hanya dapat menasionalisasi perusahaan yang dimiliki oleh negara-negara kaya, dan kedua, siapa pun yang dapat masuk ke dalam lingkup Amerika mungkin bahkan tidak bersimpati pada komunisme. , tetapi menciptakan situasi di mana, setelah dia pergi, mungkin ada ketidakstabilan yang dapat mengarah pada pemerintahan komunis, akan menjadi target AS.

Presiden Harry Truman menolak upaya Inggris untuk membujuk AS menggulingkan Mossadegh, dengan menghormati kehendak rakyat Iran. Inggris lebih beruntung dengan Dwight Eisenhower. Tak lama setelah dia dilantik, Inggris membuat nada mereka. “Tidak ingin dituduh mencoba menggunakan Amerika untuk menarik kastanye Inggris keluar dari api,” tulis Christopher Montague Woodhouse, seorang agen intelijen senior Inggris yang terlibat dalam kampanye tersebut, “Saya memutuskan untuk menekankan ancaman Komunis terhadap Iran daripada kebutuhan untuk memulihkan kendali atas industri minyak.”

Kudeta “membuka jalan bagi inkubasi ekstremisme, baik dari kiri maupun kanan. Ekstremisme ini menjadi anti-Amerika yang tidak dapat diubah,” menawarkan James A. Bill, penulis "The Shah, Ayatollah, dan AS."

Pada tahun 2000, AS akhirnya mengakui perannya dalam kudeta. “Pada tahun 1953 Amerika Serikat memainkan peran penting dalam mengatur penggulingan perdana menteri populer Iran, Mohammed Mossadegh,” kata Menteri Luar Negeri Madeleine Albright. “Pemerintahan Eisenhower percaya tindakannya dibenarkan karena alasan strategis. Tetapi kudeta itu jelas merupakan kemunduran bagi perkembangan politik Iran. Dan mudah untuk melihat sekarang mengapa banyak orang Iran terus membenci intervensi ini oleh Amerika dalam urusan internal mereka.”

Woodhouse, agen Inggris yang membujuk AS untuk terlibat, mengakui bertahun-tahun kemudian bahwa segala sesuatunya telah lepas kendali dalam upaya sederhana untuk memulihkan minyak BP.
– Dari Semua Pria Shaw

fakta tentang peran BP's dalam Kudeta Iran tahun 1953 dirinci di Huffington Post dan di Democracy Now 'tetapi menurut penelitian kami, Anda tidak akan menemukannya di Wikipedia atau media arus utama mana pun, kecuali untuk Blog BBC ini.


CIA akhirnya mengakui bahwa mereka mendalangi kudeta Iran tahun 1953

“Keterlibatan Amerika dan Inggris dalam penggulingan Mossadegh telah lama diketahui publik, tetapi posting hari ini mencakup apa yang diyakini sebagai pengakuan resmi pertama CIA bahwa badan tersebut membantu merencanakan dan melaksanakan kudeta,” kata Arsip Keamanan Nasional AS.

Publikasi Senin di bawah Undang-Undang Kebebasan Informasi AS datang sebagai sesuatu yang mengejutkan, karena sebagian besar materi dan catatan kudeta 1953 diyakini telah dihancurkan oleh CIA, kata Archive. CIA mengatakan pada saat itu bahwa “brankas terlalu penuh.”

Dokumen yang baru terungkap mendeklasifikasi dokumen tentang operasi TPAJAX CIA yang mencari perubahan rezim di Iran melalui penyuapan politisi Iran, pejabat tinggi keamanan dan tentara, dan propaganda anti-Mossadegh besar-besaran yang membantu memicu pemberontakan publik pada tahun 1953.

Di antara dokumen yang tidak diklasifikasikan ada beberapa contoh propaganda CIA yang meremehkan PM Iran Mossadegh.

“Propaganda ini menuduh Perdana Menteri berpura-pura menjadi 'penyelamat Iran' dan menuduh bahwa dia malah membangun aparat mata-mata besar yang telah dia latih di hampir setiap sektor masyarakat, dari tentara hingga surat kabar hingga politik dan agama. pemimpin,” kata Arsip. “Mengaduk-aduk gambaran aliansi yang diklaimnya dengan 'Qashqai Khan yang membunuh' dan kaum Bolshevik, para penulis menuduh: 'Apakah ini cara Anda menyelamatkan Iran, Mossadegh? Kami tahu apa yang ingin Anda selamatkan. Anda ingin menyelamatkan kediktatoran Mossadegh di Iran!’”

Pada April 1951, rakyat Iran secara demokratis memilih ketua partai Front Nasional, Dr. Mohammad Mossadegh, sebagai perdana menteri. Mossadegh bergerak cepat untuk menasionalisasi aset Perusahaan Minyak Anglo-Iran di Iran (pendahulu BP saat ini) sebuah langkah yang membawa pemerintahnya ke dalam konfrontasi dengan Inggris dan AS.

Intelijen militer MI6 Inggris kemudian bekerja sama dengan CIA dan merencanakan, menguraikan, dan melakukan kudeta yang menggulingkan Mossadegh pada Agustus 1953 dan mengembalikan Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ke tampuk kekuasaan.

Upaya kudeta pertama gagal setelah Mossadegh mengetahui konspirasi tersebut, tetapi dinas intelijen Amerika dan Inggris di Iran kemudian melakukan improvisasi tahap kedua dari kudeta, menyatukan pasukan pro-Shah dan mengorganisir protes massa pada 19 Agustus 1953. Protes ini segera didukung oleh TNI dan Polri. Rumah Mossadegh dihancurkan setelah serangan berkepanjangan oleh pasukan pro-kudeta, termasuk beberapa tank.

Mossadegh digantikan dengan jenderal Iran Fazlollah Zahedi, yang dipilih sendiri oleh MI6 dan CIA. Mossaddegh kemudian dijatuhi hukuman mati, tetapi Shah tidak pernah berani menjalankan hukuman tersebut. Mossadegh meninggal di kediamannya dekat Teheran pada tahun 1967.

Kediktatoran pro-Barat Shah berlanjut selama 27 tahun dan berakhir dengan Revolusi Islam 1979, yang membuka jalan bagi Iran saat ini, di mana sentimen anti-Amerika tetap kuat. Kudeta tahun 1953 masih membayangi hubungan Iran-AS.

Dokumen yang dideklasifikasi berasal dari laporan sementara, yang disebut "Pertempuran untuk Iran," yang disiapkan oleh sejarawan internal CIA pada pertengahan 1970-an. Sejarawan menulis: “Kudeta militer yang menggulingkan Mossadegh dan kabinet Front Nasionalnya dilakukan di bawah arahan CIA sebagai tindakan kebijakan luar negeri AS.” Laporan itu juga menyebutkan bahwa pendirian AS khawatir bahwa Iran dapat menjadi “terbuka untuk agresi Soviet,” dan oleh karena itu memprakarsai Operasi TPAJAX, yang akhirnya menjadi bagian Amerika dari 'Operasi Ajax' AS-Inggris bersama yang membawa Shah ke tampuk kekuasaan.

NS "agresi” yang disebutkan oleh sejarawan CIA kemungkinan merujuk pada intervensi Uni Soviet di Iran selama Perang Dunia II, ketika perjanjian Uni Soviet-Iran yang ditandatangani pada tahun 1940 memungkinkan Moskow untuk menetapkan preskriptif militer di Iran jika ada ancaman terhadap perbatasan Uni Soviet. Moskow menggunakan perjanjian ini selama Perang Dunia II dan sebagian menduduki Iran pada tahun 1941-1945.

Arsip Keamanan Nasional mengatakan itu sementara itu “menghargai keputusan CIA untuk menyediakan bahan-bahan ini, posting hari ini menunjukkan dengan jelas bahwa bahan-bahan ini dapat dideklasifikasi dengan aman bertahun-tahun yang lalu tanpa risiko kerusakan pada keamanan nasional.”

Meskipun setidaknya dua Presiden AS, Bill Clinton dan Barack Obama, telah secara terbuka mengakui peran AS dalam kudeta Iran, dinas intelijen di Washington selalu enggan untuk mengakui keterlibatan langsung dalam kudeta 1953.

Setelah runtuhnya Uni Soviet, CIA menyatakan "kebijakan keterbukaan" dan membuat komitmen untuk mendeklasifikasi beberapa dokumen mengenai operasi rahasia Perang Dingin, termasuk kudeta di Iran, oleh intelijen AS.

Tiga direktur CIA berturut-turut – Robert M. Gates, R. James Woolsey, dan John M. Deutch – berjanji untuk menerbitkan dokumen, tetapi tidak ada yang dikirimkan.

Wakil direktur arsip Malcolm Byrne mengimbau komunitas intelijen AS “untuk menyediakan sepenuhnya catatan yang tersisa pada periode kudeta.”

“Tidak ada lagi alasan bagus untuk menyimpan rahasia tentang episode kritis seperti itu di masa lalu kita. Fakta-fakta dasarnya diketahui secara luas oleh setiap anak sekolah di Iran. Menekan detail hanya mendistorsi sejarah, dan mendorong pembuatan mitos di semua sisi,” kata Byrne.


Bagaimana jika Mossadegh tetap berkuasa di Iran?

Futuris

Poin sampingan yang menarik, tetapi sangat mungkin bahwa Iran akan memiliki lebih banyak orang Yahudi dalam skenario seperti itu. Ketika penyihir agama berkuasa di sana pada tahun 1979, sebagian besar dari 80.000 orang Yahudi Iran yang tersisa beremigrasi, tetapi jika Revolusi Iran 1979 benar-benar dicegah, maka lebih banyak orang Yahudi mungkin tetap tinggal di Iran.

Saya juga setuju dengan apa yang ditulis @betgo dan @Larrey di sini.

Stevev

Tidak ada jawaban yang benar atau salah dalam "Bagaimana jika" ini. Geografi saja menunjukkan tingkat pengaruh Soviet. Saya juga mengatakan Iran akan tetap merdeka. Stalin ingin mempertahankan provinsi utara dan barat laut dan menahannya untuk sementara waktu setelah sekutu lainnya pergi. Ada partai komunis aktif di Iran. Saya tidak tahu mengapa Stalin mengalah kecuali mungkin untuk menghindari masalah dengan mantan sekutunya. Mossadegh adalah seorang sosialis tetapi dituduh mencari kekuasaan diktator. Dia ingin tetap netral dalam Perang Dingin yang baru lahir, tetapi tanpa sekutu, Iran rentan terhadap invasi Soviet. Mengingat Uni Soviet menginvasi Afghanistan dan lolos begitu saja, itu tidak masuk akal.


RAHASIA SEJARAH: C.I.A. di Iran -- Sebuah laporan khusus. Bagaimana Sebuah Plot Mengguncang Iran di ❓ (dan di ❹)

Selama hampir lima dekade, peran Amerika dalam kudeta militer yang menggulingkan perdana menteri terpilih Iran dan mengembalikan Shah ke tampuk kekuasaan telah hilang dari sejarah, subjek perdebatan sengit di Iran dan keheningan keras di Amerika Serikat. Satu per satu, peserta telah pensiun atau meninggal tanpa mengungkapkan rincian kunci, dan Badan Intelijen Pusat mengatakan sejumlah catatan operasi - penggulingan pertama yang sukses dari pemerintah asing - telah dihancurkan.

Tetapi salinan dari sejarah rahasia badan tersebut dari kudeta tahun 1953 telah muncul, mengungkapkan cara kerja dalam dari sebuah plot yang mengatur panggung untuk revolusi Islam pada tahun 1979, dan untuk generasi kebencian anti-Amerika di salah satu Timur Tengah& #x27s negara paling kuat.

Dokumen tersebut, yang tetap dirahasiakan, mengungkapkan peran penting yang dimainkan oleh pejabat intelijen Inggris dalam memulai dan merencanakan kudeta, dan itu menunjukkan bahwa Washington dan London memiliki minat yang sama dalam mempertahankan kendali Barat atas minyak Iran.

Sejarah rahasia, yang ditulis oleh kepala perencana kudeta CIA dan diperoleh The New York Times, mengatakan bahwa keberhasilan operasi sebagian besar adalah masalah kebetulan. Dokumen tersebut menunjukkan bahwa agensi tersebut hampir sepenuhnya menghina pria yang diberdayakannya, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, yang diejek sebagai pengecut yang bimbang. Dan itu menceritakan, untuk pertama kalinya, agensi menyiksa upaya untuk merayu dan membujuk Syah untuk mengambil bagian dalam kudetanya sendiri.

Operasi tersebut, dengan nama kode TP-Ajax, adalah cetak biru untuk suksesi C.I.A. komplotan untuk memicu kudeta dan mengacaukan pemerintah selama perang dingin -- termasuk kudeta yang berhasil dilakukan badan tersebut di Guatemala pada tahun 1954 dan intervensi Kuba yang membawa bencana yang dikenal sebagai Teluk Babi pada tahun 1961. Dalam lebih dari satu contoh, operasi semacam itu menyebabkan hal yang sama jenis permusuhan jangka panjang terhadap Amerika Serikat yang terjadi di Iran.

Sejarah mengatakan petugas badan yang mengatur kudeta Iran bekerja secara langsung dengan perwira militer Iran yang royalis, memilih sendiri pengganti perdana menteri, mengirim utusan untuk meningkatkan keberanian Shah, mengarahkan kampanye pengeboman oleh orang-orang Iran yang menyamar sebagai anggota Partai Komunis, dan memasang artikel dan kartun editorial di surat kabar.

Tetapi pada malam yang ditetapkan untuk penggulingan Perdana Menteri Mohammed Mossadegh, hampir tidak ada yang berjalan sesuai dengan rencana yang dibuat dengan cermat, kata sejarah rahasia. Bahkan, C.I.A. pejabat siap untuk meninggalkan negara itu ketika beberapa perwira Iran yang direkrut oleh badan tersebut, bertindak sendiri, mengambil alih komando demonstrasi pro-Syah di Teheran dan menangkap pemerintah.

Dua hari setelah kudeta, sejarah mengungkapkan, pejabat lembaga menyalurkan $ 5 juta ke Iran untuk membantu pemerintah yang telah mereka pasang untuk mengkonsolidasikan kekuasaan.

Garis besar peran Amerika dalam kudeta diungkapkan di Iran pada awalnya dan kemudian dalam memoar C.I.A. petugas dan akun lain yang diterbitkan. Tetapi banyak hal spesifik yang tetap dirahasiakan, dan sejarah rahasia yang diperoleh The New York Times adalah laporan rinci pemerintah pertama tentang kudeta yang dipublikasikan.

C.I.A. lambat untuk menyediakan file Iran. Dua direktur intelijen pusat, Robert Gates dan R. James Woolsey, berjanji akan membongkar catatan tindakan rahasia awal badan tersebut, termasuk kudeta. Namun badan tersebut mengatakan tiga tahun lalu bahwa sejumlah dokumen yang relevan telah dihancurkan pada awal 1960-an.

Sebuah C.I.A. Juru bicara mengatakan Jumat bahwa badan tersebut telah menyimpan sekitar 1.000 halaman dokumen yang berkaitan dengan kudeta, selain sejarah dan akun internal yang ditulis kemudian. Dia mengatakan kertas-kertas yang dihancurkan pada awal 1960-an adalah duplikat dan file kerja.

Kepala sejarawan Departemen Luar Negeri mengatakan bahwa kantornya menerima salinan sejarah tujuh tahun lalu tetapi belum ada keputusan untuk mendeklasifikasikannya.

Sejarah rahasia, bersama dengan penilaian operasional yang ditulis oleh para perencana kudeta, diberikan kepada The Times oleh seorang mantan pejabat yang menyimpan salinannya.

Itu ditulis pada bulan Maret 1954 oleh Dr. Donald N. Wilber, seorang ahli arsitektur Persia, yang sebagai salah satu perencana terkemuka percaya bahwa operasi rahasia harus banyak belajar dari sejarah.

Dalam memoar yang kurang luas yang diterbitkan pada tahun 1986, Dr. Wilber menegaskan bahwa kudeta Iran berbeda dari C.I.A. upaya. Para perencananya di Amerika, katanya, telah menimbulkan kerusuhan yang cukup besar di Iran, memberi Iran pilihan yang jelas antara ketidakstabilan dan mendukung Shah. Langkah untuk menggulingkan perdana menteri, tulisnya, dengan demikian memperoleh dukungan rakyat yang substansial.

Memoar Dr. Wilber sangat disensor oleh agensi, tetapi dia diizinkan untuk merujuk pada keberadaan sejarah rahasianya. ''Jika sejarah ini telah dibaca oleh para perencana Teluk Babi,'' dia menulis, ''tidak akan ada operasi seperti itu.''

'⟚ri waktu ke waktu,'' dia melanjutkan, ''Saya memberikan pembicaraan tentang operasi itu kepada berbagai kelompok di dalam badan tersebut, dan, di belakang, orang mungkin bertanya-tanya mengapa tidak seorang pun dari meja Kuba pernah datang atau baca sejarahnya.''

Kudeta itu merupakan titik balik dalam sejarah Iran modern dan tetap menjadi penyebab iritasi terus-menerus dalam hubungan Teheran-Washington. Ini mengkonsolidasikan kekuatan shah, yang memerintah dengan tangan besi selama 26 tahun lebih dalam kontak dekat dengan Amerika Serikat. Dia digulingkan oleh militan pada tahun 1979. Belakangan tahun itu, pengunjuk rasa pergi ke Kedutaan Besar Amerika, menyandera diplomat dan menyatakan bahwa mereka telah membuka kedok ''''sarang mata-mata'' yang telah memanipulasi Iran selama beberapa dekade.

Pemerintah Islam Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini mendukung serangan teroris terhadap kepentingan Amerika sebagian besar karena sejarah panjang Amerika yang mendukung Shah. Bahkan di bawah penguasa yang lebih moderat, banyak orang Iran masih membenci peran Amerika Serikat dalam kudeta dan dukungannya terhadap Syah.

Menteri Luar Negeri Madeleine K. Albright, dalam sebuah pidato di bulan Maret, mengakui peran penting kudeta dalam hubungan yang bermasalah dan semakin dekat untuk meminta maaf daripada pejabat Amerika mana pun sebelumnya.

''Pemerintahan Eisenhower percaya bahwa tindakannya dibenarkan karena alasan strategis,'' katanya. ''Tapi kudeta itu jelas merupakan kemunduran bagi perkembangan politik Iran. Dan sekarang mudah untuk melihat mengapa banyak orang Iran terus membenci intervensi Amerika ini dalam urusan dalam negeri mereka.''

Sejarah menguraikan perhitungan yang dirujuk oleh Dr. Albright dalam pidatonya.

Inggris, katanya, memprakarsai rencana itu pada tahun 1952. Pemerintahan Truman menolaknya, tetapi Presiden Eisenhower menyetujuinya tak lama setelah menjabat pada tahun 1953, karena kekhawatiran tentang minyak dan Komunisme.

Dokumen itu menarik beberapa pukulan, mengakui pada satu titik bahwa badan tersebut berbohong kepada sekutu Inggrisnya. Dr. Wilber menyisihkan sebagian besar perhatiannya untuk sekutu lokal badan tersebut, mengacu pada ''ketidakmampuan yang diakui orang Iran untuk merencanakan atau bertindak dengan cara yang benar-benar logis.''

Inggris Melawan Nasionalisme Minyak

Kudeta itu berakar pada pertikaian Inggris dengan Iran, yang bergolak di bawah dominasi Inggris yang hampir kolonial selama beberapa dekade.

Hadiahnya adalah ladang minyak Iran. Inggris menduduki Iran dalam Perang Dunia II untuk melindungi rute pasokan ke sekutunya, Uni Soviet, dan untuk mencegah minyak jatuh ke tangan Nazi -- menggulingkan ayah Syah, yang dianggapnya tidak bisa diatur. Ia mempertahankan kendali atas minyak Iran setelah perang melalui Perusahaan Minyak Anglo-Iran.

Pada tahun 1951, Parlemen Iran memilih untuk menasionalisasi industri minyak, dan para legislator yang mendukung undang-undang tersebut memilih advokat utamanya, Dr. Mossadegh, sebagai perdana menteri.

Inggris menanggapi dengan ancaman dan sanksi. Dr. Mossadegh, seorang pengacara berpendidikan Eropa yang saat itu berusia awal 70-an, cenderung menangis dan meledak-ledak, menolak untuk mundur. Dalam pertemuan pada bulan November dan Desember 1952, sejarah rahasia mengatakan, pejabat intelijen Inggris mengejutkan rekan-rekan Amerika mereka dengan rencana operasi bersama untuk menggulingkan perdana menteri yang lemah.

Orang Amerika, yang ''tidak bermaksud membahas pertanyaan ini sama sekali,'' setuju untuk mempelajarinya, kata sejarah rahasia. Itu memiliki atraksi. Anti-Komunisme telah meningkat ke puncaknya di Washington, dan para pejabat khawatir bahwa Iran akan jatuh di bawah kekuasaan Uni Soviet, sebuah kehadiran bersejarah di sana.

Pada bulan Maret 1953, perkembangan tak terduga mendorong plot ke depan: stasiun CIA di Teheran melaporkan bahwa seorang jenderal Iran telah mendekati Kedutaan Besar Amerika untuk mendukung kudeta yang dipimpin tentara.

Pemerintahan Eisenhower yang baru dilantik tertarik. Koalisi yang memilih Dr. Mossadegh pecah, dan Partai Komunis Iran, Tudeh, menjadi aktif.

Allen W. Dulles, direktur intelijen pusat, menyetujui $ 1 juta pada tanggal 4 April untuk digunakan '⟞ngan cara apa pun yang akan menyebabkan jatuhnya Mossadegh,'' menurut sejarah.

''Tujuannya adalah untuk membawa ke kekuasaan sebuah pemerintahan yang akan mencapai penyelesaian minyak yang adil, memungkinkan Iran menjadi sehat secara ekonomi dan pelarut finansial, dan yang akan dengan penuh semangat menuntut Partai Komunis yang kuat dan berbahaya.''

Dalam beberapa hari, pejabat badan tersebut mengidentifikasi seorang perwira tinggi, Jenderal Fazlollah Zahedi, sebagai orang yang mempelopori kudeta. Rencana mereka meminta shah untuk memainkan peran utama.

'ɺ shah-Jenderal Zahedi kombinasi, didukung oleh C.I.A. aset lokal dan dukungan keuangan, akan memiliki peluang bagus untuk menggulingkan Mossadegh,'' para pejabat menulis, ''terutama jika kombinasi ini harus bisa mendapatkan massa terbesar di jalan-jalan dan jika bagian yang cukup besar dari Teheran garnisun menolak untuk melaksanakan perintah Mossadegh.''

Namun menurut sejarah, para perencana sempat ragu apakah Syah bisa melakukan operasi yang begitu berani.

Keluarganya telah merebut tahta Iran hanya 32 tahun sebelumnya, ketika ayahnya yang berkuasa memimpin kudetanya sendiri. Tapi Shah muda, tulis pejabat agensi, '''secara alami adalah makhluk yang ragu-ragu, diliputi oleh keraguan dan ketakutan yang tak berbentuk,'' sering berselisih dengan keluarganya, termasuk Putri Ashraf, ''kekuatan dan saudara kembar yang licik.''

Juga, shah memiliki apa yang C.I.A. disebut '''ketakutan patologis'' terhadap intrik Inggris, suatu hambatan potensial bagi operasi gabungan.

Pada bulan Mei 1953, badan tersebut mengirim Dr. Wilber ke Siprus untuk bertemu dengan Norman Darbyshire, kepala intelijen Inggris cabang Iran, untuk membuat rencana kudeta awal. Meredakan ketakutan shah menjadi agenda utama mereka, sebuah dokumen dari pertemuan itu mengatakan dia harus dibujuk bahwa Amerika Serikat dan Inggris ''menganggap pertanyaan minyak sebagai masalah sekunder.''

Percakapan di pertemuan itu beralih ke topik yang sensitif, identitas agen kunci di Iran. Inggris mengatakan mereka telah merekrut dua bersaudara bernama Rashidian. Amerika, sejarah rahasia mengungkapkan, tidak mempercayai Inggris dan berbohong tentang identitas 'ɺset'' terbaik mereka di Iran.

C.I.A. para pejabat terbagi atas apakah rencana yang disusun di Siprus dapat berhasil. Stasiun Teheran memperingatkan markas besar bahwa ''Syah tidak akan bertindak tegas terhadap Mossadegh.'' Dan dikatakan bahwa Jenderal Zahedi, orang yang dipilih untuk memimpin kudeta, ''tampak kurang dorongan, energi dan rencana konkret.''

Terlepas dari keraguan, stasiun agensi Teheran mulai menyebarkan ''propaganda abu-abu,'' membagikan kartun anti-Mossadegh di jalan-jalan dan memasang artikel yang tidak menarik di pers lokal.

Mencoba Membujuk Shah yang Enggan

Plot sedang berlangsung, meskipun shah adalah seorang pejuang yang enggan dan Tuan Eisenhower belum memberikan persetujuan terakhirnya.

Pada awal Juni, pejabat intelijen Amerika dan Inggris bertemu lagi, kali ini di Beirut, dan memberikan sentuhan akhir pada strategi. Segera setelah itu, kepala divisi Timur Dekat dan Afrika CIA, Kermit Roosevelt, cucu Theodore Roosevelt, tiba di Teheran untuk mengarahkannya.

Shah adalah masalah dari awal. Rencana itu meminta dia untuk berdiri teguh sebagai C.I.A. membangkitkan keresahan rakyat dan kemudian, ketika negara itu bergerak menuju kekacauan, mengeluarkan dekrit kerajaan yang memberhentikan Dr. Mossadegh dan menunjuk perdana menteri Jenderal Zahedi.

Agensi berusaha untuk ''menghasilkan tekanan sedemikian rupa pada Syah sehingga akan lebih mudah baginya untuk menandatangani surat-surat yang diperlukan daripada menolak,'' sejarah rahasia menyatakan. Officials turned to his sister for help.

On July 11, President Eisenhower finally signed off on the plan. At about the same time, C.I.A. and British intelligence officers visited Princess Ashraf on the French Riviera and persuaded her to return to Iran and tell her brother to follow the script.

The return of the unpopular princess unleashed a storm of protest from pro-Mossadegh forces. The shah was furious that she had come back without his approval and refused at first to see her. But a palace staff member -- another British agent, according to the secret history -- gained Ashraf access on July 29.

The history does not reveal what the siblings said to each other. But the princess gave her brother the news that C.I.A. officials had enlisted Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf in the coup campaign. General Schwarzkopf, the father of the Persian Gulf war commander, had befriended the shah a decade earlier while leading the United States military mission to Iran, and he told the agency ''he was sure he could get the required cooperation.''

The British, too, sought to sway the shah and assure him their agents spoke for London. A British agent, Asadollah Rashidian, approached him in late July and invited him to select a phrase that would then be broadcast at prearranged times on the BBC's Persian-language program -- as proof that Mr. Rashidian spoke for the British.

The exercise did not seem to have much effect. The shah told Mr. Rashidian on July 30 and 31 that he had heard the broadcast, but ''requested time to assess the situation.''

In early August, the C.I.A. stepped up the pressure. Iranian operatives pretending to be Communists threatened Muslim leaders with ''savage punishment if they opposed Mossadegh,'' seeking to stir anti-Communist sentiment in the religious community.

In addition, the secret history says, the house of at least one prominent Muslim was bombed by C.I.A. agents posing as Communists. It does not say whether anyone was hurt in this attack.

The agency was also intensifying its propaganda campaign. A leading newspaper owner was granted a personal loan of about $45,000, ''in the belief that this would make his organ amenable to our purposes.''

But the shah remained intransigent. In an Aug. 1 meeting with General Schwarzkopf, he refused to sign the C.I.A.-written decrees firing Mr. Mossadegh and appointing General Zahedi. He said he doubted that the army would support him in a showdown.

During the meeting, the document says, the shah was so convinced that the palace was bugged that he ''led the general into the grand ballroom, pulled a small table to its exact center'' and got onto it to talk, insisting that the general do the same.

''This meeting was to be followed by a series of additional ones, some between Roosevelt and the shah and some between Rashidian and the shah, in which relentless pressure was exerted in frustrating attempts to overcome an entrenched attitude of vacillation and indecision,'' the history states.

Dr. Mossadegh had by now figured out that there was a plot against him. He moved to consolidate power by calling for a national referendum to dissolve Parliament.

The results of the Aug. 4 referendum were clearly rigged in his favor The New York Times reported the same day that the prime minister had won 99.9 percent of the vote. This only helped the plotters, providing 'ɺn issue on which Mossadegh could be relentlessly attacked'' by the agency-backed opposition press.

But the shah still wouldn't move against Dr. Mossadegh.

''On Aug. 3rd,'' the secret history says, ''Roosevelt had a long and inconclusive session with the shah,'' who ''stated that he was not an adventurer, and hence, could not take the chances of one.

''Roosevelt pointed out that there was no other way by which the government could be changed and the test was now between Mossadegh and his force and the shah and the army, which was still with him, but which would soon slip away.''

Mr. Roosevelt told the shah ''that failure to act could lead only to a Communist Iran or to a second Korea.''

Still haunted by doubts, the shah asked Mr. Roosevelt if President Eisenhower could tell him what to do.

'ɻy complete coincidence and great good fortune,'' the secret history says, ''the president, while addressing the governors' convention in Seattle on 4 August, deviated from his script to state by implication that the United States would not sit by idly and see Iran fall behind the Iron Curtain.''

By Aug. 10, the shah had finally agreed to see General Zahedi and a few army officers involved in the plot, but still refused to sign the decrees. The C.I.A. then sent Mr. Rashidian to say Mr. Roosevelt ''would leave in complete disgust unless the shah took action within a few days.''

The shah finally signed the decrees on Aug. 13. Word that he would support an army-led coup spread rapidly among the army officers backing General Zahedi.

First Few Days Look Disastrous

The coup began on the night of Aug. 15 and was immediately compromised by a talkative Iranian Army officer whose remarks were relayed to Mr. Mossadegh.

The operation, the secret history says, ''still might have succeeded in spite of this advance warning had not most of the participants proved to be inept or lacking in decision at the critical juncture.''

Dr. Mossadegh's chief of staff, Gen. Taghi Riahi, learned of the plot hours before it was to begin and sent his deputy to the barracks of the Imperial Guard.

The deputy was arrested there, according to the history, just as pro-shah soldiers were fanning out across the city arresting other senior officials. Telephone lines between army and government offices were cut, and the telephone exchange was occupied.

But phones inexplicably continued to function, which gave Dr. Mossadegh's forces a key advantage. General Riahi also eluded the pro-shah units, rallying commanders to the prime minister's side.

Pro-shah soldiers sent to arrest Dr. Mossadegh at his home were instead captured. The top military officer working with General Zahedi fled when he saw tanks and loyal government soldiers at army headquarters.

The next morning, the history states, the Tehran radio announced that a coup against the government had failed, and Dr. Mossadegh scrambled to strengthen his hold on the army and key installations. C.I.A. officers inside the embassy were flying blind the history says they had ''no way of knowing what was happening.''

Mr. Roosevelt left the embassy and tracked down General Zahedi, who was in hiding north of Tehran. Surprisingly, the general was not ready to abandon the operation. The coup, the two men agreed, could still work, provided they could persuade the public that General Zahedi was the lawful prime minister.

To accomplish this, the history discloses, the coup plotters had to get out the news that the shah had signed the two decrees.

The C.I.A. station in Tehran sent a message to The Associated Press in New York, asserting that ''unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the shah, one dismissing Mossadegh and the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him.''

The C.I.A. and its agents also arranged for the decrees to be mentioned in some Tehran papers, the history says.

The propaganda initiative quickly bogged down. Many of the C.I.A.'s Iranian agents were under arrest or on the run. That afternoon, agency operatives prepared a statement from General Zahedi that they hoped to distribute publicly. But they could not find a printing press that was not being watched by forces loyal to the prime minister.

On Aug. 16, prospects of reviving the operation were dealt a seemingly a fatal blow when it was learned that the shah had bolted to Baghdad. C.I.A. headquarters cabled Tehran urging Mr. Roosevelt, the station chief, to leave immediately.

He did not agree, insisting that there was still 'ɺ slight remaining chance of success,'' if the shah would broadcast an address on the Baghdad radio and General Zahedi took an aggressive stand.

The first sign that the tide might turn came with reports that Iranian soldiers had broken up Tudeh, or Communist, groups, beating them and making them chant their support for the shah. ''The station continued to feel that the project was not quite dead,'' the secret history recounts.

Meanwhile, Dr. Mossadegh had overreached, playing into the C.I.A.'s hands by dissolving Parliament after the coup.

On the morning of Aug. 17 the shah finally announced from Baghdad that he had signed the decrees -- though he had by now delayed so long that plotters feared it was too late.

At this critical point Dr. Mossadegh let down his guard. Lulled by the shah's departure and the arrests of some officers involved in the coup, the government recalled most troops it had stationed around the city, believing that the danger had passed.

That night the C.I.A. arranged for General Zahedi and other key Iranian agents and army officers to be smuggled into the embassy compound ''in the bottom of cars and in closed jeeps'' for a 'ɼouncil of war.''

They agreed to start a counterattack on Aug. 19, sending a leading cleric from Tehran to the holy city of Qum to try to orchestrate a call for a holy war against Communism. (The religious forces they were trying to manipulate would years later call the United States ''the Great Satan.'')

Using travel papers forged by the C.I.A., key army officers went to outlying army garrisons to persuade commanders to join the coup.

Once again, the shah disappointed the C.I.A. He left Baghdad for Rome the next day, apparently an exile. Newspapers supporting Dr. Mossadegh reported that the Pahlevi dynasty had come to an end, and a statement from the Communist Party's central committee attributed the coup attempt to 'ɺnglo-American intrigue.'' Demonstrators ripped down imperial statues -- as they would again 26 years later during the Islamic revolution.

The C.I.A. station cabled headquarters for advice on whether to 'ɼontinue with TP-Ajax or withdraw.''

''Headquarters spent a day featured by depression and despair,'' the history states, adding, ''The message sent to Tehran on the night of Aug. 18 said that 'the operation has been tried and failed,' and that 'in the absence of strong recommendations to the contrary operations against Mossadegh should be discontinued.' ''

C.I.A. and Moscow Are Both Surprised

But just as the Americans were ready to quit, the mood on the streets of Tehran shifted.

On the morning of Aug. 19, several Tehran papers published the shah's long-awaited decrees, and soon pro-shah crowds were building in the streets.

''They needed only leadership,'' the secret history says. And Iranian agents of the C.I.A. provided it. Without specific orders, a journalist who was one of the agency's most important Iranian agents led a crowd toward Parliament, inciting people to set fire to the offices of a newspaper owned by Dr. Mossadegh's foreign minister. Another Iranian C.I.A. agent led a crowd to sack the offices of pro-Tudeh papers.

''The news that something quite startling was happening spread at great speed throughout the city,'' the history states.

The C.I.A. tried to exploit the situation, sending urgent messages that the Rashidian brothers and two key American agents should ''swing the security forces to the side of the demonstrators.''

But things were now moving far too quickly for the agency to manage. An Iranian Army colonel who had been involved in the plot several days earlier suddenly appeared outside Parliament with a tank, while members of the now-disbanded Imperial Guard seized trucks and drove through the streets. 'ɻy 10:15 there were pro-shah truckloads of military personnel at all the main squares,'' the secret history says.

By noon the crowds began to receive direct leadership from a few officers involved in the plot and some who had switched sides. Within an hour the central telegraph office fell, and telegrams were sent to the provinces urging a pro-shah uprising. After a brief shootout, police headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs fell as well.

The Tehran radio remained the biggest prize. With the government's fate uncertain, it was broadcasting a program on cotton prices. But by early afternoon a mass of civilians, army officers and policemen overwhelmed it. Pro-shah speakers went on the air, broadcasting the coup's success and reading the royal decrees.

At the embassy, C.I.A. officers were elated, and Mr. Roosevelt got General Zahedi out of hiding. An army officer found a tank and drove him to the radio station, where he spoke to the nation.

Dr. Mossadegh and other government officials were rounded up, while officers supporting General Zahedi placed ''known supporters of TP-Ajax'' in command of all units of the Tehran garrison.

The Soviet Union was caught completely off-guard. Even as the Mossadegh government was falling, the Moscow radio was broadcasting a story on ''the failure of the American adventure in Iran.''

But C.I.A. headquarters was as surprised as Moscow. When news of the coup's success arrived, it ''seemed to be a bad joke, in view of the depression that still hung on from the day before,'' the history says.

Throughout the day, Washington got most of its information from news agencies, receiving only two cablegrams from the station. Mr. Roosevelt later explained that if he had told headquarters what was going on, ''London and Washington would have thought they were crazy and told them to stop immediately,'' the history states.

Still, the C.I.A. took full credit inside the government. The following year it overthrew the government of Guatemala, and a myth developed that the agency could topple governments anywhere in the world.

Iran proved that third world king-making could be heady.

''It was a day that should never have ended,'' the C.I.A.'s secret history said, describing Aug. 19, 1953. 'ɿor it carried with it such a sense of excitement, of satisfaction and of jubilation that it is doubtful whether any other can come up to it.''

Donald Wilber, who planned the coup in Iran and wrote its secret history, was old-school C.I.A., a Princetonian and a Middle East architecture expert who fit neatly into the mold of the ''gentleman spy.''

Years of wandering through Middle Eastern architectural sites gave him the perfect cover for a clandestine life. By 1953, he was an obvious choice as the operation's strategist.

The coup was the high point of his life as a spy. Although he would excel in academia, at the agency being part-time was a handicap.

''I never requested promotion, and was given only one, after the conclusion of Ajax,'' Dr. Wilber wrote of the Iran operation.

On his last day, ''I was ushered down to the lobby by a young secretary, turned over my badge to her and left.'' He added, ''This treatment rankled for some time. I did deserve the paperweight.''


Mossadegh Ousted in Iran - History

Iran appears to be on the road to stability , commented Troy, New York newspaper The Times Record in their fresh reaction to the 1953 coup in Iran.

An adjacent editorial retroactively slammed Truman and Acheson for having tolerated Communist infiltration in the government. Ini diikuti oleh Eisenhower Is Right, which showered praise on the President s approach to fighting Communism.

Imagine how much they would have adored him had they only known that Ike had sanctioned an elaborate, covert CIA scheme to crush Premier Mossadegh, whom they passionately detested.

The surrender of pajama-clad Mohammed Mossadegh, ousted premier of Iran, is a dramatic incident in keeping with the sensation-packed developments of recent weeks. This tame surrender to the Shah s representative brought Mossadegh full circle. Only a few hours earlier he had placed a price on the head of the man to whom he surrendered himself, Premier Zehedi. [sic &mdash General Fazlollah Zahedi]

Behind the drama, however, lies substantial hope for Iran s return to tranquility under a stable and representative government. The would-be dictator is himself exhibiting confidence in the new government by surrendering. Evidently he is aware that the reign of the mobs and the terror of assassination which he instituted are ended. [Unbelievable gall]

Shah Pahlevi s [Mohammad Reza Pahlavi] order to protect Mossadegh and the scrupulous discharge by the new premier of his promise to safeguard the prisoner from lynching are good signs for the future. Legal processes apparently have been restored and the authorities are preserving order.

Moreover, moderation is substituted for violence. The fact that Mossadegh is not dealt with summarily speaks well for the new regime. Iran has seen too much rioting and bloodshed. The country desperately needs a calm and stable government. With Mossadegh in custody the chief source of disorder is removed.


Mossadegh Revisited

On August 19, 1953, tragedy struck Tehran, Iran’s capital city. Democratically-elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown in a coup d’état orchestrated by the American CIA and British Mi6.

For the previous two centuries, foreign powers (largely Britain and Russia) had exerted a heavy hand in Iran’s affairs, reaping the country’s resources for themselves at the expense of Iran (as noted by Iran expert Christopher de Bellaigue in his book, Patriot of Persia). Mossadegh represented a very real chance for the Iranian people to get out from under the grip of foreign control and manipulation and chart their own path. Elected in 1951, he introduced many progressive reforms during his two years as prime minister, the most notable of which was the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, under British control since 1913. The company represented for Iranians the oppression they had received at the hands of the British for centuries (de Bellaigue, 2012). By nationalizing oil and taking other steps to improve the lives of everyday Iranians, Mohammad Mossadegh became a national hero (Kinzer, 2003 de Bellaigue 2012). At last, it appeared as if the Iranian people were pushing back against the grip of foreign influence, and putting themselves in charge of their own affairs.

But the British would not let the oil affair go. And so, goading their American allies into thinking that Mossadegh’s leadership would steer Iran to Communism, the two partners successfully orchestrated a coup to depose Mossadegh. The Shah of Iran, who at the time had been largely relegated to the figure of a constitutional monarch, was given absolute authority over the country (de Bellaigue). His torturous reign lasted until 1979, when he was overthrown in the Iranian Revolution, and the “Islamic Republic” established. Under the new regime, the government has largely suppressed homages to both Mossadegh and the Shah (de Bellaigue).

Today in Iran, despite widespread name recognition, information on Mossadegh is suppressed, and most people do not know the details of his life and overthrow. The promise of Mossadegh’s governance was immense, but due to this suppression, Iranians are unable to reflect on their first experiment with democracy. It makes sense that an undemocratic regime like the Islamic Republic would censor information on Mossadegh, as his legacy has had powerful impacts throughout the region and the world his role in the Non-Aligned Movement, the coup’s relevance to recent events in the region, and the impacts the coup had on the perpetrators themselves are testament to this. Mossadegh’s legacy continues to exert a strong presence on both Iran and the region, despite his memory being suppressed in his home country.

In Iran, the suppression of Mossadegh’s legacy is typically well enforced. But every so often, there are times when a thaw in the iron grip of authority leads people to examine Mossadegh and the 1953 coup. It happened after the Shah was overthrown (but before the Islamic Republic fully established itself), it happened in the late 90s with the election of a liberal prime minister, and it is happening now (de Bellaigue, 2012).

Currently, one of Tehran’s most popular plays focuses on Mohammad Mossadegh and the coup d’etat to oust his government. Called “Dr Mossadeq’s Nightly Reports,” it is the director Asghar Khalili’s attempt to make Mossadegh better known in a substantive, not merely superficial, way.

That superficiality is partly what makes Mossadegh’s legacy in Iran so peculiar. People know of him, but they don’t know much about him. Thus, the play seems to be feeding a curiosity in young Iranians surrounding the figure of Mossadegh and the events of 1953. One audience member said, “I came because I don’t know much about Mossadegh though we owe him a lot. They do him an injustice by overlooking him here. It’s important to get more information.”

It is therefore not a surprise that the play has generated so much interest in Tehran. But not all of the information coming out on Mossadegh in Iran is genuine in its complete historical accuracy. Although they allowed it to run, government authorities have forced changes onto the play’s script. A new television show has also debuted on the coup, but it is heavily censored, with a strong bias toward the Islamic regime.

Even Mossadegh’s place of death is well known by Iranians despite limitations on information about his life. Mossadegh passed away in 1967, after over a decade of house arrest, and is buried on his estate in the small village of Ahmad Abad. During the political thaw after the Shah fell, people came from far and wide to Ahmad Abad to pay their respects. On the twelfth anniversary of Mossadegh’s death, several hundred thousand people descended on Ahmad Abad to visit Mossadegh’s home (de Bellaigue, 2012). However, when the Islamic Republic consolidated their hold over the country, the rate of visitation slowed to a trickle. The caretaker of Mossadegh’s estate notes that “[The Islamic regime] do not want people to know he’s here to arouse nationalism again.” In spite of this, there’s a common familiarity with the town over a wide radius.

Of the few tributes to Mossadegh that remain in Iran, most are implicit: March 20th, the day oil was nationalized, is a national holiday, but it doesn’t explicitly celebrate Mossadegh’s role in that accomplishment. As Khalili, the director of the aforementioned play, notes, “school textbooks only treat Mossadeq briefly.” He believes that the image of Mossadegh is suppressed not because he was secular but because he is an advocate of democracy.

Despite the fact that the Islamic Republic distances itself from Mossadegh as much as possible, perhaps the most major event of the revolution known to Westerners, the Iranian Hostage Crisis, occurred in the shadow of Mossadegh’s legacy. Iranians correctly saw the American embassy as the “den of spies” from which the 1953 coup had been launched, and so to prevent an American attempt to put the ousted Shah back into power, they seized the embassy. Yet this parallel isn’t discussed openly in Iran, or the fact that the many of the high ranking clergy worked with the “Great Satan” to overthrow Mossadegh (de Bellaigue, 2012 Kinzer, 2003).

The suppression of information on, and celebration of, Mohammad Mossadegh in Iran has been robust and near-total. The government either denies access to or alters works mentioning Mossadegh (including Stephen Kinzer’s tremendous account of the coup, All the Shah’s Men). As Kinzer notes, “Laws forbade calling for a democratic republican to replace the Islamic regime, but praising Mossadegh’s legacy was another way of doing the same thing.” People are generally in the dark about many of the details of his life, one of the reason for the aforementioned play’s success. There is a great misunderstanding amongst many people about some of the most mundane aspects of Mossadegh’s legacy, including what caused his death (Kinzer, 2003).

Yet outside Iran, Mossadegh’s legacy pervades movements around the world. Three years after Mossadegh’s ousting, Egypt’s president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. Many believe that Mossadegh inspired Nasser to nationalize the Canal, with the British once again becoming bogged down in a conflict with a strong nationalist foe. In this case, Nasser was successful, and the last vestiges of the once-mighty British Empire died in Egypt. Although Mossadegh was unable to remove foreign influence from Iran, the strength of his efforts helped Egypt to do so.

Five years after the Suez Crisis, Nasser and other nationalist leaders gathered in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to form the Non-Aligned Movement, which was founded on the principle of neutrality towards the major two Cold War power blocs. Today, the NAM has grown to 115 countries. The movement “represents the interests and priorities of developing countries” and represents a sort of anti-power bloc, where Great Powers are not permitted to engage.

Prior to the 16th NAM summit in Tehran in 2012, Iranian history expert Hamid Dabashi wrote that “had Mosaddegh been allowed to be in office, he would have been a natural ally of the Non-Aligned Movement, perhaps one of its founding figures. It is not even too far fetched to think that the treacherous coup against Mossadegh’s government was at least a factor behind the Non-Aligned Movement.” Mossadegh was a strong proponent of charting an independent course for Iran and wresting the Middle East from European intervention, while the NAM is dedicated to both the economic and governmental sovereignty of its member nations from those of the large power blocs. Thus, Mossadegh’s views on economic and legislative freedom were completely congruent with those of the Non-Aligned Movement.

It is also possible to draw parallels between the 1953 coup and subsequent events in the region and around the world. US Secretary of State John Kerry recently did just that, saying at a recent talk at the University of Chicago that “[T]he CIA was directly involved in the removal of a Prime Minister — Mossadegh, 1953. And so there was a history there. And in 1979, when they took over our embassy and took them hostages that had a profound effect on our own politics — one of the principal reasons that President Carter lost to Ronald Reagan.” The coup had consequences nearly thirty years after it was carried out, both on the country that perpetrated it and its victim. The US has since expressed remorse for their part in overthrowing Mossadegh, but bizarrely, it seems to see the episode as an isolated event, as opposed to noticing similar problems in its broad-scale intervention in the region.

More than thirty years on from the election of Reagan, and more than sixty since the coup, the effects of the overthrow of Mossadegh continue to influence events in the region. An anonymous Iranian official drew parallels between last summer’s coup in Turkey and that which deposed of Mossadegh, saying “this coup might be made up of several waves it happened in Iran in 1953. When the first coup failed, they had another one ready — and they succeeded.”

It is clear that, on that night in Turkey, the visage of Mossadegh hung over events taking place in the streets, much as it had done in the Suez sixty years earlier. Within the region and around the world, the legacy of Mossadegh has had a positive influence on nations seeking to chart a course away from foreign influences that would disregard their sovereignty, and toward self-determination. In this modern era, with Western powers still exploiting their way through the Third World, it is clear that colonialism has not ended, but only evolved. In a myriad number of cases, Western governments and corporations are still making off with vast quantities of plundered resources from under-developed nations. “Mossadeghism” is the insistence that these foreign influences pack up, go home, and leave the running of and resources of a country to its people.

People in Iran today speak of Mossadegh “with regret and even guilt, as well as with reverence” (de Bellaigue, 2012). Yet even for those Iranians who wish to look back on Mossadegh’s life, the continue censorship of information about him forestalls any real attempt at understanding. In a testament to how powerful Mossadegh could be in Iran if he were more widely understood, Mossadegh’s legacy has had profound effects in other parts of the region — events like the Suez Crisis, the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement, and even the recent coup in Turkey all bear his fingerprints.

However, the influence of those who unjustly ousted Mossadegh lingers. As long as the US continues its behavior of Middle East intervention and support of unpopular regimes in the region, the Islamic government currently in power in Tehran has fodder to use to scare its subjects into submission, and is able to justify its continued suppression of the memory of Mossadegh and democracy. Mossadegh is as real as Iran itself, but he remains only a distant and hazy memory. It seems as if only when democracy creeps back out of the shadows in Iran will the name Mossadegh ring forth once more.


Mossadegh Ousted in Iran - History

C oup 53 of Iran is the CIA's (Central Intelligence Agency) first successful overthrow of a foreign government.

But a copy of the agency's secret history of the coup has surfaced, revealing the inner workings of a plot that set the stage for the Islamic revolution in 1979, and for a generation of anti-American hatred in one of the Middle East's most powerful countries. The document, which remains classified, discloses the pivotal role British intelligence officials played in initiating and planning the coup, and it shows that Washington and London shared an interest in maintaining the West's control over Iranian oil.

Dr. Donald N. Wilber, a CIA spy, with the cover of archeologist and authority on ancient Persia,
who planned the coup in Iran along with British SIS officer Norman Darbyshire.
(Photo courtesy of National Security Archive)
The secret history, written by the CIA's chief coup planner, says the operation's success was mostly a matter of chance. The document shows that the agency had almost complete contempt for the man it was empowering, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. And it recounts, for the first time, the agency's badly tried to seduce and force the shah into taking part in his own coup.

The operation, code-named TP-AJAX, was the blueprint for a succession of CIA plots to foment coups and destabilize governments during the cold war - including the agency's successful coup in Guatemala in 1954 and the disastrous Cuban intervention known as the Bay of Pigs in 1961. In more than one instance, such operations led to the same kind of long-term animosity toward the United States that occurred in Iran.

The history says agency officers orchestrating the Iran coup worked directly with royalist Iranian military officers, handpicked the prime minister's replacement, sent a stream of envoys to bolster the shah's courage, directed a campaign of bombings by Iranians posing as members of the Communist Party, and planted articles and editorial cartoons in newspapers.

But on the night set for Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq's overthrow, almost nothing went according to the meticulously drawn plans, the secret history says. In fact, CIA officials were poised to flee the country when several Iranian officers recruited by the agency, acting on their own, took command of a pro-shah demonstration in Tehran and seized the government.

Two days after the coup, the history discloses, agency officials funneled $5 million to Iran to help the government they had installed consolidate power.

Dr. Donald N. Wilber, an expert in Persian architecture, who as one of the leading planners believed that covert operatives had much to learn from history, wrote the secret history, along with operational assessments in March 1954.

In less expansive memoirs published in 1986, Dr. Wilber asserted that the Iran coup was different from later CIA efforts. Its American planners, he said, had stirred up considerable unrest in Iran, giving Iranians a clear choice between instability and supporting the shah. The move to oust the prime minister, he wrote, thus gained substantial popular support.

Dr. Wilber's memoirs were heavily censored by the agency, but he was allowed to refer to the existence of his secret history. "If this history had been read by the planners of the Bay of Pigs," he wrote, "there would have been no such operation."

"From time to time," he continued, "I gave talks on the operation to various groups within the agency, and, in hindsight, one might wonder why no one from the Cuban desk ever came or read the history."

The coup was a turning point in modern Iranian history and remains a persistent irritant in Tehran-Washington relations. It consolidated the power of the shah, who ruled with an iron hand for 26 more years in close contact with the United States. He was toppled by Iranian Revolution of 1979. Later that year, "Students of Imam Line" went to the American Embassy, took diplomats hostage and declared that they had unmasked a "nest of spies" who had been manipulating Iran for decades.

The Islamic government of Ayatollah Khomeini supported terrorist attacks against American interests largely because of the long American history of supporting the shah's suppressive regime. Even under more moderate rulers, many Iranians still resent the United States' role in the coup and its support of the shah.

Former US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, in an address, acknowledged the coup's pivotal role in the troubled relationship and came closer to apologizing than any American official ever has before.

"The Eisenhower administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons," she said. "But the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs."

The history spells out the calculations to which Dr. Albright referred in her speech. Britain, it says, initiated the plot in 1952. The Truman administration rejected it, but President Eisenhower approved it shortly after taking office in 1953, because of fears about oil and Communism.

The document pulls few punches, acknowledging at one point that the agency baldly lied to its British allies. Dr. Wilber reserves his most withering asides for the agency's local allies, referring to "the recognized incapacity of Iranians to plan or act in a thoroughly logical manner."

Shah with General Fazlollah Zahdei (right), spearhead
of CIA planned coup of 1953 in favour of Shah
Britain Fights Oil Nationalism
The coup had its roots in a British showdown with Iran, restive under decades of near-colonial British domination.

The prize was Iran's oil fields. Britain occupied Iran in World War II to protect a supply route to its ally, the Soviet Union, and to prevent the oil from falling into the hands of the Nazis - ousting the shah's father, whom it regarded as unmanageable. It retained control over Iran's oil after the war through the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

In 1951, Iran's Parliament voted to nationalize the oil industry, and legislators backing the law elected its leading advocate, Dr. Mosaddeq, as prime minister. Britain responded with threats and sanctions.

Dr. Mosaddeq, a European-educated lawyer then in his early 70's, prone to tears and outbursts, refused to back down. In meetings in November and December 1952, the secret history says, British intelligence officials startled their American counterparts with a plan for a joint operation to oust the nettlesome prime minister.

The Americans, who "had not intended to discuss this question at all," agreed to study it, the secret history says. It had attractions. Anti-Communism had risen to a fever pitch in Washington, and officials were worried that Iran might fall under the sway of the Soviet Union, a historical presence there.

In March 1953, an unexpected development pushed the plot forward: the CIA's Tehran station reported that an Iranian general had approached the American Embassy about supporting an army-led coup.

The newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration was intrigued. The coalition that elected Dr. Mosaddeq was splintering, and the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh, had become active.

Allen W. Dulles, the director of central intelligence, approved $1 million on April 4 to be used "in any way that would bring about the fall of Mosaddeq," the history says.

"The aim was to bring to power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement, enabling Iran to become economically sound and financially solvent, and which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong Communist Party."

Within days agency officials identified a high-ranking officer, Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, as the man to spearhead a coup. Their plan called for the shah to play a leading role.

"A shah-General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mosaddeq," officials wrote, "particularly if this combination should be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizable portion of the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mosaddeq's orders."

But according to the history, planners had doubts about whether the shah could carry out such a bold operation.

His family had seized Iran's throne just 32 years earlier, when his powerful father led a coup of his own. But the young shah, agency officials wrote, was "by nature a creature of indecision, beset by formless doubts and fears," often at odds with his family, including Princess Ashraf, his "forceful and scheming twin sister."

Also, the shah had what the CIA termed a "pathological fear" of British intrigues, a potential obstacle to a joint operation.

In May 1953 the agency sent Dr. Wilber to Cyprus to meet Norman Darbyshire, chief of the Iran branch of British intelligence, to make initial coup plans. Assuaging the fears of the shah was high on their agenda a document from the meeting said he was to be persuaded that the United States and Britain "consider the oil question secondary."

The conversation at the meeting turned to a touchy subject, the identity of key agents inside Iran. The British said they had recruited two brothers named Rashidian. The Americans, the secret history discloses, did not trust the British and lied about the identity of their best "assets" inside Iran.

CIA officials were divided over whether the plan drawn up in Cyprus could work. The Tehran station warned headquarters that the "the shah would not act decisively against Mosaddeq." And it said General Zahedi, the man picked to lead the coup, "appeared lacking in drive, energy and concrete plans."

Despite the doubts, the agency's Tehran station began disseminating "gray propaganda," passing out anti-Mosaddeq cartoons in the streets and planting unflattering articles in the local press.


Mossadegh & Me

Mossadegh & Me is a film about how we remember the 1950s in Iran, and the CIA coup that ousted then Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh.

In 1979, the Iranian Hostage Crisis shocked the world. The crisis received more non-stop press coverage than any other event since World War II. Americans, for the first time, asked, "Why do they hate us?" As an Iranian-American kid, director Gita Saedi Kiely asked that question, too. That’s when her father told her about Mohammed Mossadegh.

The story of Mossadegh (1882-1967) is woven into the fabric of every Iranian family. As Prime Minister of Iran, Mossadegh initiated democracy in the Middle East half a century before the United States declared the ideology a justification for war in the region. He became a symbol of independence and hope for a people. And the story of his rise and fall has as much to do with American history as it does Iranian history. His tenure came to an abrupt halt when the newly-formed C.I.A. implemented its first covert coup d’etat. In August of 1953, Mossadegh was ousted, arrested for treason, and replaced by the Western-endorsed Shah of Iran.

Iranians hold onto this complicated history no matter where they reside. Mossadegh & Me will follow Saedi Kiely’s father and his peers as they remember this moment in Iran – as students, activists and dreamers. By examining the subjectivity of perception and recollection (the "Rashomon effect"), Mossadegh & Me will explore how we remember the past as it fits into our own cultural narrative. Attaching personal memories to this tumultuous time, Mossadegh & Me spins a cautionary tale of historic importance while ruminating on ideas of homeland and history.

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Tonton videonya: REVOLUSI IRAN PADA TAHUN 1979